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Abstract 
 America's Sex Offense statutes and cases are some of the most controversial 
sections of modern law, both for the extreme sensitivity of their subject matter as well as 
the scope and application of those laws. This thesis is an analysis and overview of both 
the objective and subjective issues posed by the current state of those very laws: the 
subjective portion explored the development of current laws and the diverse attendant 
legal issues such as over-broadness and excessive or misdirected effect as compared 
to the Legislative and public intent which directly led to the development of these laws. 
Additionally a more objective study of their efficacy was conducted through the use of 
data regarding offense rates by locality. This objective data was procured from both the 
United States Census and Bureau of Justice statistics, which contained national 
averages such as the overall violent crime rate, and from the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement Statistics and was supplemented with additional data from other academic 
sources.  
 It is both the subjective conclusion and the interpretation of objective data that 
while the rate of sex offenses has lowered in recent decades this effect is a part of the 
overall trend of reduction in all violent offenses, and that the extreme stance of modern 
sex offense laws have arguably resulted in the net-negative of creating a class of 
individuals ostracized from all but other sex offenders who are virtually incapable of 
supporting themselves or at times of even finding legal habitation post-release. With 
little to no chance of a productive life, there is the strong possibility of recidivism and 
little incentive to avoid re-offending. 
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Introduction 
 In American society sexual or sex-related offenses are considered especially 
severe, it is not an undue generalization to state that on the whole those committed 
against children quite possibly considered the most heinous crime an individual may 
commit. It is not an improper conclusion to state that this very abhorrence has been a 
direct motivating factor in the development of the current system of laws, regulations, 
and restrictions pertaining to sex offenses and the perpetrators thereof… or perhaps 
more rather it is a (if not the) motivating factor in the particularly extreme nature of said 
laws.   
 
 In order to understand and explore the issues presented by these laws it is 
necessary to examine their developmental history. The current state of jurisprudence in 
this area did not spring forth whole and complete from the federal legislature as Athena 
from the head of Zeus; it evolved over a great deal of time, in fits and starts, first at the 
state level and then concurrently with (or at the direction of) interrelating federal 
legislation. Throughout their many iterations these laws (federal and state) received 
either direct legal challenges leading to their alteration or were influenced in their 
development by contemporaneous cases in other jurisdictions, binding or otherwise.  
 
 However, before returning to the beginning it will be easier to recognize the 
parallels and significance of various developments if the reader has in mind where the 
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law stands today: In current day America there exists a standardized system1 of public 
registration and interstate information sharing for all registered sex offenders. Data is 
collected (most often at the state level) in the processing of offenders and the federal 
government has established a codified system of standards for publication and 
interstate information sharing, as well as the proscribed registration schedules for 
various classes of sex offenders. This system of laws comes primarily from the Adam 
Walsh Protection Act, signed into law in 2006 by then President George W. Bush, and is 
also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (hereafter SORNA). 
SORNA was drafted to deal with the morass of diverse state laws, offender 
classifications, and inconsistent information formats which it superseded.  
                                                 
1 42 USC §16911 et seq. 
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Genesis 
 The practice of compiling lists of individuals convicted of certain crimes and of 
compelling them to register their whereabouts with local law enforcement is not a new 
one; the concept itself began, or at least grew to significance, as early as 1931 in 
Californian cities. Originally these registries, created to deal with what was at the time 
considered to be a grave threat to the American public, were not comprised of sex 
offenders but rather registered those convicted of various criminal acts which were 
commonly (or at least thought to be) connected with organized crime2 and ostensibly 
provided law enforcement with a way to essentially ban convicted gangsters from their 
city. Shortly thereafter the state of California expanded these registrations to include sex 
offenses, creating in 1947 the first statewide law3 requiring that anyone convicted of 
certain crimes be compelled to provide fingerprints and a photograph to the Sheriff's 
office, as well as a written update on their location within five days of changing 
residence. Though on the surface this would seem to be an almost perfect parallel to 
SORNA right out of the gate, in function if not in subject matter, there is one particular 
and fundamental difference: in contrast to today's laws information which was registered 
under that system was explicitly forbidden to any members of the public, only a 
"regularly employed peace or other law enforcement officer" was permitted to inspect 
the material4.   
                                                 
2Los Angeles, California, County Ordinance No. 2339 (1993), 
http://www.solresearch.org/~SOLR/cache/gov/US/loc/CA-LA/19330911-file4788.pdf  
3 Cal. Pen. Code Article IX Ch. 1-8 (1947), 
http://www.solresearch.org/~SOLR/cache/gov/US/st/CA/legis/code/Penal-1947-sex.pdf 
4 California Penal Code Article IX Ch.5 §290 (1947) 
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  With a focus almost entirely on organized crime at this point rather than sexual 
offenses the question becomes one of how legislation migrated from the former to the 
latter. The answer is both predictable and not. Predictably over time the registrable 
offenses were expanded to sex offenses in addition to those related to organized crime, 
but in a somewhat surprising move in 1960 the California Supreme Court struck down 
all of the state's criminal registration laws in Abbott v. Los Angeles5… except for sex 
offenses. Perhaps having withstood a State Supreme Court ruling these laws were 
somehow legitimized, or perhaps it was merely an issue of publicity or even sheer 
happenstance; Whatever the cause the ball had been set rolling and over the next three 
decades a handful of states, some mindful of the conspicuous exception to the court's 
actions in Abbott and others more broad, would pass laws creating statewide offender 
registries of some kind or another. 
The First Wave 
 These laws, enacted over the years from 1944-1993, have the notable distinction 
of being the only offender registries designed and passed without direction or mandate 
by the federal government. They instead grew organically out of the needs or desires of 
the states which passed them, and as such are as diverse in character and effect as the 
states which enacted them.  
 
                                                 
5 Abbott v. Los Angeles 53 Cal. 2d 674, (Cal. 1960) 
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 As has been stated the progenitor-law of this field was California's 1944 addition 
to the penal code6, which was followed within the decade by Arizona in 1951 (later 
replaced by an 1985 statute). After these two states the next burst of legislation would 
begin in 1957 with a notable law in Florida requiring all convicted felons to register; 
though in 1993 a later addition to the state statutes would be made specifically 
concerning sex offenders. From there Nevada would pass its registry in 1961 with Ohio 
following suit a mere two years later in 1963. Alabama, being the last state to pass any 
form of sex offender registration law for 16 years in 1967, would become the bookend of 
a curious legislative gap until in 1984 at which point within the next decade twenty six 
more states ranging from Utah to Rhode Island would pass their own offender 
registries… the majority of them in a mere 6 years. A surprising wave of activity to be 
sure, particularly in its later years as the pace of legislation rapidly accelerated, but 
despite this barely more than half of the United States would have created their own 
registries by the time the federal government stepped in and forced the issue. 
                                                 
6 California Penal Code Article IX Ch.5 §290 (1947) 
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Opening the Floodgates 
 Whatever it was which led to the initially glacial pace of legislation on this matter 
it soon gave way as a series of highly publicized assaults on children rocked the nation 
over the following three years. The remaining half of the states of the Union which had 
not yet created a sex offender registry now had no choice in the matter. They would 
have to design a registry meeting federally mandated requirements by 1997, the 
deadline set by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act7 of 1994. In the Wetterling Act all states were required to form 
a registry of sexually violent offenders and those who committed sexual offenses 
against children, as well as verify the address of registered offenders on an annual 
basis for ten years and sexually violent offenders on a quarterly basis for life. During the 
time the unamended Wetterling Act was in effect little was standardized among these 
registries and beyond the residence verification requirements much of what to do with a 
registry was left to the discretion of the state in possession of it. Of particular note is that 
even under this act there was no mandatory publication of offenders or offense data, 
nor were the classifications of various offenses standardized. At this time such things 
were still dealt with exclusively at the state or even local level.  
Wetterling Amended: Megan's Law 
 Once again change would be brought by tragedy. The lack of a publication 
requirement would change when in 1996, a mere two years after the Wetterling Act 
                                                 
7 42 USC  § 14071 et seq 
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passed, seven year old Megan Kanka of New Jersey was raped and murdered by a 
previously convicted sex offender who had been living across the street from her family 
the entire time. Public outrage and fear at the thought of released sex offenders living 
anonymously among the general public drove the passing of an amendment to the 
Wetterling Act named after Megan. The newly amended Wetterling Act, now bearing 
Megan's Law, would require law enforcement to release information from their local sex 
offender registries deemed relevant to protecting the public… though as with the 
Wetterling Act's registries themselves what precisely would be deemed relevant and in 
what format such information should be released was once again left to the states. By 
the end of 1996 the last of the states, save only for Massachusetts, finally constructed 
their own sex offender registries in order to meet the deadline set a mere four years 
prior by the Wetterling Act. But though the Wetterling Act and Megan's Law amendment 
bore a great resemblance to the modern standard in many ways, chiefly among them 
mandatory registration, a rough degree of offender classification, and publicly viewable 
registries, there was still little true standardization as what exact information was 
released, in what format it was made available, and even the precise nature of said 
offender classifications were all left to the discretion of the states 8.  
Piecemeal Progress 
In short order it likely became apparent to all involved that a lack of communication 
would be a major loophole in these laws; given the technology of the mid-90s and the 
disparate standards and protocols of the states someone convicted and registered as a 
                                                 
8 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1996) 
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sex offender had an all too effective means of evading their infamy simply by moving to 
another state. Mere months after passing the Megan's Law amendment the federal 
government would address this problem in what was a radical departure from their 
previous legislation's deference to the discretion of the states. Up until this point each 
state had been required to have their own individual sex offender registry, but, by and 
large they were allowed to design and run those registries as they saw fit; a system 
which by its very nature included little standardization, and as evinced by the apparent 
necessity of legislating such a bold solution likely allowed for even less communication 
and oversight.  The United States Government's solution to this problem was the Pam 
Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of October 1996. Along with the 
soon to follow Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997 this back to back burst of 
federal legislation would form what is possibly the closest analogue to SORNA at the 
federal level before the actual Adam Walsh act itself.  
 
 As part of the Lychner Act's efforts to combat the Wetterling Act's greatest 
weakness the Attorney General was directed to establish the National Sex Offender 
Registry (NSOR), which would allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to track sex 
offenders across the entirety of the United States. The law acted as both a patch and a 
facilitator; the FBI was empowered to directly handle the registration of sex offenders 
living in states with insufficient registries and to perform its own address verifications 
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thereof, disseminate information "necessary to protect the public"9 to any involved law 
enforcement officials (federal, state, or local), and most importantly notify relevant 
federal and state agencies when a given offender moved to another state.  
 
 The key pieces of SORNA were beginning to fall into place: Every state had a 
sex offender registry meeting at least certain minimum functional requirements, data 
from those registries was published for consumption by the general public, and at this 
point a national registry curated by the FBI and Attorney General served to facilitate the 
tracking of offenders across state lines. Still, there was something missing. 
 
 That final, vital, piece to the puzzle would be provided by the 1997 Jacob 
Wetterling Improvements Act. Where the Lychner Act cut broadly across a widespread 
issue this law would be an act of refinement, a surgical legislative strike of depth and 
precision. More loopholes were closed such as requiring the relevant offenders to 
register in states where they worked or attended school (if that was not their state of 
residence), requiring offenders who moved to re-register under their new state of 
domicile's laws, and compelling states to put in place procedures for various situations 
involving non-resident offenders. Additionally, to deal with the ever broadening morbid 
creativity of the criminal element, States were also given the discretion to register 
individuals convicted of offenses not specifically included in the original Wetterling Act. 
They were also given permission to create an agency outside of ordinary law 
                                                 
9 The Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. no. 104-236, 110 Stat 
3094 (1996). PDF  
 9
enforcement to handle their burgeoning responsibilities of notification and registration. 
Lest it be thought that this legislation was entirely one sided it should be noted that the 
federal government was not without its additional share of responsibilities as well, it 
bearing the requirement for the Bureau of Prisons to notify the states of paroled federal 
offenders and for the Secretary of Defense to ensure the proper registration of those 
same offenders. But most importantly of all was a single clause, one which would have 
the most profound effect out of all changes and laws since the original mandate of the 
Wetterling Act: 
 
"(A) STATE REPORTING.—State procedures shall ensure that the 
registration information is promptly made available to a law enforcement 
agency having jurisdiction where the person expects to reside and entered 
into the appropriate State records or data system. State procedures shall 
also ensure that conviction data and fingerprints for persons required to 
register are promptly transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." 10 
 
 In less than 70 words the Wetterling Improvements Act ordered every state to 
communicate data on offenders to other states when an offender changes residence, 
and to ensure that the data regarding their conviction and a means of identification of 
every sex offender, in every state, is added to a single unified National Sexual Offender 
Registry. Though federal law would not explicitly state the requirement for unified 
communications protocols for another nine years this single clause of the Wetterling 
Improvements Act constitutes a de facto attempt at implementing what would later 
become SORNA's primary goal. The requirement to readily share information with fellow 
states, and proactively with the federal government, would by its very nature create a 
                                                 
10 1997 - The Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. no. 105-119, 111 Stat 2440. PDF 
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powerful impetus towards standardization of laws and protocols across the United 
States. 
The Dawn of the Modern Legal Era 
 Respect for the historical and legal significance of this legislation should 
not be taken as praise, however, as the Wetterling Improvements Act is not 
without controversy and brings with it the possible birth of a multitude of hard 
legal questions which have yet to be satisfactorily answered. The creation of this 
new system of communication now meant that being branded a sex offender was 
truly an inescapable scar on one's person, as sure as a scarlet letter, and one 
which would with the dawn of the information age become a source of ostracism 
and at times even personal danger wherever they went within the United States. 
Furthermore the decision to allow victim's advocates and law enforcement 
representatives to testify as to whether an offender should be considered 
sexually violent or not, rather than relying exclusively on the empirical testimony 
of experts in relevant medical and criminal fields, may well have had a profound 
effect on the disproportionate growth of sex offender registries versus the actual 
rate of crime as courts were now open to be swayed by impassioned testimony 
rather than merely informed by empirical statistics and data.  
 
 It can be argued that the Wetterling Improvements Act marked the turning 
point where legislative concern for safety and the efficacy of law enforcement 
took a back seat in favor of garnering political capital through ever "tougher" and 
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more public treatment of sex offenders… a strategy which by its very nature 
necessitated a continual presence of The Predator in the public consciousness 
even as the overall rate of sexual offenses (and indeed all crime) rapidly 
plummeted11. The legal and in particular constitutional concerns raised by this 
change of pace will be discussed later in this work along with a number of 
notable cases regarding sex offender registration laws. 
 
 There would be a number of additional acts passed by the federal government 
from 1997 until SORNA's debut, ranging from federal assistance programs to help 
states comply with the increasingly complicated mandates through the adoption of the 
World Wide Web for the publication of sex offender registries all the way to requiring 
special notice be given to universities (and the students therein) when a registered sex 
offender enrolled or was hired as faculty. None would have any truly significant effect on 
the overall character of this area of law, though they would add to the increasingly 
opaque wall of requirements and mandates, further aggravating the problems caused 
by a lack of any real standardization among the states who once again had their own 
ideas of how to best fulfill the very general requirements of the various federal acts 
passed.  
 
 The legal morass that America's sex offender laws had become would be the 
status quo until, finally, legislation to put everyone on the same page once and for all 
                                                 
11 Florida Department of Law Enforcement, (n.d.). Ucr offense statistics (1971-2010) 
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was passed in the form of the previously mentioned Adam Walsh Protection Act12 of 
2006. In addition to the (by this time) predictable and always politically popular move of 
increasing sentences for most sex related crimes SORNA also created and retroactively 
applied a nationwide uniform set of standards for the classification, registration, and 
publication of both sex offenders and child abusers. The benefits of this standardization 
are difficult to overstate; even for the offenders there was a sort of cold boon as at one 
time it was possible for an arbitrary number of states to have differing registration 
requirements and classifications for the same individual. Under SORNA however even 
an offender could at least be sure of their status from one state to the next, providing at 
least a consistent standing under the law. It would be local law enforcement 
departments however which would derive the greatest tangible benefit from the change. 
The new communication protocols and standardized classifications, in tandem with just 
shy of a decade's (voluntary or not) cooperation with the NSOR, would suddenly give 
police departments the ability to track and manage offenders in their jurisdictions like 
never before. Where in the past an out of state offender of a given classification may 
have only been identifiable by comparing fingerprints with the federal database or slip 
by entirely, under SORNA the offender's data would (at least in theory) be readily and 
immediately available in a compatible format and would be immediately comparable to 
their own local laws and regulations. 
 
                                                 
12 42 U.S.C. § 16911 et seq 
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  Furthermore in a unique twist of the federal government adopting a state 
invented construct SORNA would include, in what is quite possibly its most 
constitutionally controversial component, an extension of the long standing state laws 
concerning civil commitment; the Adam Walsh Protection Act allowed for a federal judge 
to commit anyone meeting certain criteria13 to involuntary confinement and treatment in 
a civil mental health institution, even if the offender in question had completed their 
original sentence, so long as a judicial review was held every six months if requested by 
either the federal treatment program or council. The long standing trend of ever harsher 
and more constitutionally questionable post-release "punishments" had finally reached 
what may be considered the inevitable conclusion: the ability to simply lock away those 
considered too abhorrent to be allowed to live in the world and throw away the key. 
                                                 
13 42 U.S.C. § 16971 
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The Elephant in the Room: Legal Challenges 
 As stated once before SORNA and its precursors were some of the most 
constitutionally controversial legislative acts outside of those referring to aliens and 
sedition. Seeing its history laid out thusly allows for the 20/20 of hindsight to be put to 
healthy use; Controversial aspects of that development now may be addressed with 
greater academic rigor with respect to issues of liberty and constitutionality than during 
the midst of the meteoric rise of Sexual Predator Politics.   
 
 It was inevitable that such far reaching legislation over the decades would have 
equally far reaching and significant legal questions for the courts to settle, and indeed 
the various laws proscribing and regulating sex offender registration were challenged in 
the courts at both the state and federal level across the decades; sometimes 
successfully and sometimes not, and often making for persuasive if not always binding 
precedents. It was in this environment of ever changing and historically ever broadening 
precedent which SORNA and all its attendant laws and amendments evolved, not in a 
vacuum. For the purposes of this examination it is best to discuss these legal 
challenges in chronological order so as to facilitate the comparison between legislative 
and judicial developments. 
 
 As previously mentioned the first wave of federal legislation carried with it the 
deadline that by 1997 all states must be in compliance with the Wetterling Act or face a 
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significant reduction in federal aid14. Faced with such an ultimatum a flurry of state 
legislation followed the original Wetterling Act, with fully half of the states drafting their 
own sex offender legislation shortly after the Wetterling Act was signed into law. As with 
all sudden and profound changes there were bound to be equally profound 
repercussions, and repercussions there were, beginning with Kansas v. Hendricks15 in 
1997.  
Kansas v Hendricks: …and Throw Away the Key 
 In order to meet the Wetterling Act's mandate Kansas passed the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act in 1994 which, in addition to meeting the registration requirements 
of the Wetterling Act, also contained some of the earliest provisions for the civil 
commitment of "any person who, due to "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" is 
likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence"16. This is not to be confused with 
the legal option to commit the mentally ill to involuntary treatment, as the SVPA's 
preamble states: this legislation was explicitly written to deal with "[a] small but 
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental 
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment"17.  
 
 Enter Leroy Hendricks, a convicted sex offender with an extensive history of 
sexually molesting children, having committed numerous instances of the crime from 
1960 up until his most recent incarceration in approximately 1972. Hendricks had been 
                                                 
14 42 USC  § 14071 et seq 
15 Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
16 Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Justice Thomas delivering the majority opinion 
17 Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29a01 (1994) 
 16
in and out of both prison and mental health facilities for some time and had in fact been 
determined, prior to his final incarceration preceding this case, to be "safe to be at 
large"18. As Hendricks was nearing his release date of his most recent prison sentence 
in September of 1994 Kansas filed a petition to commit him to a civil treatment facility 
involuntarily. In response Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the SVP Act and 
demanded a trial by jury; a request which the court granted though it refused judgment 
on the matter of constitutionality. During this trial Hendricks admitted that when 
"stressed out"19 he continues to feel the uncontrollable urge to molest children and 
openly agreed with the state physician's diagnosis that he was not cured of his 
pedophilia, going so far as to state that "treatment is bullshit". The Jury evidently agreed 
and found him to be a sexually violent predator, while the court determined pedophilia to 
be a "mental abnormality" and proceeded with plans for commitment. On appeal 
Hendricks reiterated his challenge that the SVPA was a violation of his right to Due 
Process and protection from Double Jeopardy, as well as constituting an Ex Post Facto 
law.  
 
 The Kansas state Supreme Court granted certiorari, accepting that appeal, and 
found in favor of Hendricks. The Kansas Supreme Court found that the standard of a 
"mental abnormality" as opposed to a "mental illness" failed to satisfy Substantive Due 
Process in light of the penalty of involuntary civil commitment, but declined to address 
the issues of Ex Post Facto and double jeopardy. Unwilling to accept this outcome 
                                                 
18Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Writ of Certiorari  
19Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Writ of Certiorari 
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Kansas appealed to the  United States Supreme Court , and was granted certiorari as 
Kansas v. Hendricks20. The  United States Supreme Court  was not as amenable to 
Hendricks' arguments and in what would become the future precedent for involuntary 
civil commitment in the United States despite being split 5-4 proceeded to eviscerate 
Hendricks' arguments. On the grounds of civil commitment the court flatly stated that a 
defendant's liberty interests "may be overridden even in the civil context"21 and 
proceeded to declare that the SVPA clearly set forth the necessary "procedures and 
evidentiary standards" such that it does not constitute a violation of Hendricks' 
Substantive Due Process rights. The argument of a "mental illness" versus a "mental 
abnormality" was openly dismissed as a matter of clerical preference as "The legislature 
is therefore not required to use the specific term "mental illness" and is free to adopt any 
similar term."   
 
 Most controversially of all though is the United States Supreme Court's opinion 
with respect to Hendricks' cross petition. Hendricks claimed that civil commitment 
constitutes a "newly enacted punishment… predicated upon past conduct for which he 
has already been convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence". The Court was 
"unpersuaded" by this claim and stated "Nothing on the face of the statute" even 
suggested that the SVPA's civil commitment program was designed for any purpose 
beyond protecting the public from harm rather than criminal law's primary objectives of 
"retribution or deterrence". The Court continued to examine a number of factors 
                                                 
20 Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997)  
21 Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
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differentiating Kansas' civil commitment program from a criminal proceeding, such as a 
lack of a scienter, criminal responsibility being unnecessary for commitment, and the 
assumed lack of any deterrent effect as it is presumed that those with a "mental 
abnormality" will not be deterred by the threat of confinement. The Court furthermore 
rejected the argument that the indefinite duration of commitment was evidence of a 
punitive nature, finding instead that "the confinement's duration is instead linked to the 
stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental 
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others" and that the consistent 
judicial reexamination of the necessity of that confinement satisfies Due Process; 
finding that safeguard reasonably allows for confinement so long as someone is a 
"menace to the health and safety of others". Even Hendricks' most convincing 
argument, that combined with the utter lack of legitimate attempts at treatment the 
totality of the circumstances proved that commitment was nothing more than a 
disguised prison sentence, was rejected with the argument that "incapacitation may be 
a legitimate end of the civil law" where even those with untreatable conditions or for 
whom treatment is "not the state's overriding concern" are concerned.  
 
 Hendricks may thus be summed as an individual claiming that what looks like a 
criminal case, sounds like a criminal case, has an almost indistinguishable end result 
from a criminal case, and possesses none of the alleged characteristics of a civil 
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commitment for one's own and the public's "greater good"22 must be a criminal case 
versus the rebutting argument that civil commitment is not a punitive measure or 
criminal in nature because… it is not a punitive measure or criminal in nature. That 
virtually tautological argument was also the basis for rejecting Hendricks' complaint that 
the SVPA constituted a violation of his protection against Double Jeopardy and Ex Post 
Facto; such complaints are inherently related to a criminal proceeding or punitive 
measures and simply do not apply to a civil action which by definition can not be a 
second trial or a punitive measure. 
Kansas v. Crane: Token Safeguards 
 Following quickly on the heels of Hendricks from the same state was Kansas v. 
Crane23. Unlike the preceding case Crane did not make a sweeping challenge to the 
SVPA itself but rather the case hinged on a point of interpretation regarding the 
necessary attributes of an offender in order to qualify for involuntary commitment. The 
case began when Michael Crane pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and 
(following his plea) the state entered a request that he be evaluated for possible 
commitment under the SVPA. With the SVPA firmly vindicated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States' decision in Hendricks the question at this point was one of 
qualification; Did Michael Crane meet the standard of a "mental abnormality" or 
"personality disorder" possessing him of either an "emotional or volitional capacity which 
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses" or "which makes the 
                                                 
22 A particularly notable point, as more individuals have died of natural causes since the program's 
inception than have been released according to Larned superintendant Chris Burke in testimony given to 
the Kansas House Social Services Budget Committee on January 26 of 2011. 
23 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) 
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person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence."24 In the state's opinion25 
Crane's exhibitionism in and of itself did not qualify under the SVPA for commitment, but 
in combination with his antisocial personality disorder showed a pattern of "increasing 
frequency of incidents involving [respondent], increasing intensity of the incidents, 
[respondent's] increasing disregard for the rights of others, and… increasing daring and 
aggressiveness." which was found to be a combination of "willful and unlawful" behavior 
qualifying Crane for commitment under the SVPA even though his disorders were not 
found to negatively affect his "volitional control" in a manner significant enough to 
prevent him from "[controlling] his dangerous behavior". Following this evaluation Crane 
was ordered to be committed by the Kansas District Court, a decision which Crane 
naturally appealed. As in Hendricks the Kansas Supreme Court erred in favor of the 
defendant, interpreting the decision of Hendricks to require finding that a defendant has 
an inability to control the dangerous behavior in question even if they have an emotional 
or personality disorder rather than one of volitional control. 
 
 Once again Kansas appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari, and settled the matter. Unlike Hendricks however this time the United 
States Supreme Court handed down a decision which was neither entirely in favor of 
Kansas' attempts at commitment nor entirely against Crane. Being a much narrower 
case, concerning itself almost solely with the question of self-control (or rather a lack 
thereof justifying commitment), the decision was likewise narrower and at the same time 
                                                 
24 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§59-29a02(a), (b) (2000 Cum. Supp.) 
25 In re Crane, 269 Kan. 578, 579, 7 P. 3d 285, 287 (2000) 
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more refined. The Court did agree with Kansas that Hendricks did not require finding an 
individual to have an absolute inability to control their actions before committing them 
under the SVPA, clarifying that the standard in Hendricks was that an individual finds it 
"difficult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous 
behavior"26, a significant distinction as it is plainly evident that even the most disturbed 
of individuals retain at least some ability to control their actions. At the same time the 
Supreme Court also stated that a lack of any determination regarding an offender's self-
control is in plain violation of the standard set forth in Hendricks which the Court felt 
emphasized the constitutional significance of properly distinguishing those offenders 
most suited to commitment "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more 
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings." In its decision in Crane 
the court pointed out that the ambiguity of this standard was not an oversight, but a 
deliberate attempt to provide only a more general framework for the topic at hand as 
constitutional safeguards with relation to mental illness "are not always best enforced 
through precise bright-line rules." because of the ever evolving nature of psychiatry as 
well as the discretion which the states have in enumerating what precisely constitutes a 
given mental abnormality or illness within their jurisdiction. In summation of their opinion 
the Supreme Court of the United States felt it most proper to point out that there is 
inherent overlap between volitional, cognitive, and emotional abnormalities and that in 
"ordinary English" individuals with these families of disorders are “unable to control their 
dangerousness” and likewise for constitutional purposes it is unnecessary to distinguish 
                                                 
26 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
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between them so long as an examination is made and that standard of at least 
substantially uncontrollable dangerousness is met. Having clarified the requirements of 
due process and the new standard for the controllability of dangerous behaviors the 
case was officially found in favor of Kansas with regards to Crane in particular and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 
  
Smith v. Doe: Stirrings of Dissent 
 The next case of note is Smith v. Doe27, which continued the line of Ex Post 
Facto challenges to sex offender registration laws. The case began in Alaska as two 
John Does challenged the retroactive nature of Alaska's sex offender registration law, 
which required all sex offenders who entered the state to register with local law 
enforcement or the state Department of Corrections within one day of entering Alaska. 
John Doe I and II, who had been convicted of sexually abusing minors before the 
passage of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA), filed suit on grounds 
that applying the registration requirement retroactively was a punitive measure in 
violation of their constitutional protections28 and seeking relief from the application of 
that act. Similar to both of the cases from Kansas previously discussed the Does were 
first ruled against and then the appellate court found in their favor. 
 
                                                 
27 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
28 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 
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 The United States Supreme Court accepted the case in 2001 when Alaska 
appealed the Circuit Court's decision that the act was by nature punitive and therefore in 
violation of Ex Post Facto restrictions. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in 
2003 in which, for the first time, the Court directly asked the question of whether a sex 
offender registration program was in violation of constitutional prohibitions on Ex Post 
Facto laws rather than sidestepping all argument altogether through taking as a given 
that the law in question was civil in nature. To answer this question the Court decided to 
follow a multi-pronged analysis of the law, asking whether the act in question was 
initially punitive in nature (thus settling the matter immediately) or if it instead intended 
to create civil proceedings of a regulatory nature. If the latter was found to be the case a 
second step was to be taken, analyzing whether the act was in actuality "so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'"29  
 
 In answer to that first question the Court, despite being willing to discuss the 
issue now, still followed its previous logic in the two cases from Kansas; essentially, 
starting with a civil nature being a foregone conclusion and from there setting the bar for 
overcoming this presumption to be so high that "'only the clearest proof ' will suffice to 
override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into 
a criminal penalty."30 Following this standard of deference to legislative intent the Court 
naturally found it most expedient to cite directly the Alaskan Legislature's explicit 
                                                 
29 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), Justice Kennedy quoting 448 U. S. 242 (1980) 
30 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), Justice Kennedy quoting 522 U. S. 93 (1997) in turn quoting 448 U. 
S. 242 (1980)  
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statement of intent in ASORA to "[protect] the public from sex offenders"31 by the 
"release of certain information… to public agencies and the general public". With this 
legislative intent being so expressly stated the Court returned to its opinion in 
Hendricks, finding in this case as it did previously the "imposition of restrictive 
measures"32  to be the "legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective" (emphasis 
added) of  "a civil ... scheme designed to protect the public from harm".  
 
 Previous to this point it has been commented that the Court's actions and 
rationale may show an underlying bias in favor of sex offender registration, it is at this 
point that bias is demonstrated openly as the Court blatantly engages in an act of 
doublethink, citing at once Hendricks as a binding precedent and yet at the same time 
directly contradicting that precedent when it proves inconvenient in the current case: 
Where before the Court held that it was a virtual certainty that the "objective to create a 
civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the [SVPR] within [Kansas'] probate 
code, instead of the criminal code"33 the Court, now reading an act held within a state's 
criminal code in Smith v. Doe, reversed its position and argued that "The location and 
labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a 
criminal one."34. It is at once the position of the Supreme Court of the United States that 
the placement of an offender registration act within the civil code of a state is sufficient 
                                                 
31 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, §1 
32 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346  
33 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
34 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
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evidence that said act is civil in nature, and that the placement of an offender 
registration act within the criminal code of another state is immaterial to the act's nature. 
 
 With the issue of legislative classification thus settled the Court continued on to 
answer the question of whether or not, as the Does alleged, ASORA was still in effect a 
punitive measure despite professing to be a mere civil regulatory scheme. To open this 
analysis the Court referred first to a test of seven factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez35; Specifically the five factors of whether the topic of examination "has been 
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability 
or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose"36. The majority 
opinion, which would meet bitter disagreement from Justice Ginsburg and Stevens' 
dissents, examined each factor in turn:  
 
 In regard to the history and traditions of punishment, particularly relevant as the 
Does alleged ASORA "resemble[d] shaming punishments of the colonial period", the 
Court felt that "Any initial resemblance to early punishments is, however, misleading." It 
was the majority's argument that the "dissemination of accurate information about a 
criminal record, most of which is already public" is not analogous to the punishments of 
colonial times as it does not "[stage] a direct confrontation between the offender and the 
public" nor qualifies as punishment as it is in "furtherance of a legitimate governmental 
                                                 
35 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) 
36 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
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objective". The argument at its core was that the State did not intentionally produce 
publicity and stigma as "an integral part of [ASORA's] objective" and that any humiliation 
or ostracism was a "collateral consequence".  
 
 An astute observer will at this point notice a pattern of growing polarization with 
regard to registered sex offenders… a schism between the opinions of those who find 
themselves questioning the efficacy and constitutionality of the increasingly harsh and 
public measures and those who display a growing callousness and utter disregard for, 
or perhaps disconnection from, the consequences of registration. The latter, being the 
majority in this case, argued that the utter ostracism, loss of any real employment 
prospects, and constant (wholly justified) fear of vigilante attacks was a mere "collateral 
consequence" not because it was truly an unpredictable byproduct but because the 
State did not intentionally seek to provoke these reactions as their primary focus with 
ASORA; a position analogous to the teacher who punishes an entire class specifically 
for the actions of a single student and later proclaims ignorance when that same student 
is violently attacked in revenge. 
  
 Continuing in the Mendoza-Martinez analysis the next factor examined by the 
Court was the issue of whether or not ASORA subjected the Does to an "affirmative 
disability or restraint."37 As the process of registration is obviously not an act of 
incarceration there is unarguably no issue of affirmative restraint. However, the Court 
                                                 
37 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) 
 27
also felt that ASORA's obligations are less harsh or restrictive than other legislative acts 
which debar individuals from a given occupation, and that furthermore "The Act does 
not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or 
residences." Once again the majority opinion's interpretation was severely disputed in a 
dissenting opinion from Justices Ginsburg and Stevens who flatly disagreed, stating 
respectively "Beyond doubt, the Act involves an 'affirmative disability or restraint.' 372 U. 
S., at 168" and "The statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe 
stigma on every person to whom they apply". Justice Stevens additionally made note of 
the true significance of the burden placed on registrants under ASORA: An applicable 
offender was required to provide (as listed in Justice Stevens dissent) "his address, his 
place of employment, the address of his employer, the license plate number and make 
and model of any car to which he has access, a current photo, identifying features, and 
medical treatment" at least once a year for 15 years and up to four times a year for life; 
nor may an offender shave, color their hair, change employers, or borrow a car without 
notifying the authorities. And in all cases an offender is given a single working day to 
provide updated information to the authorities. Thus while the majority is indeed 
accurate in saying that offenders under ASORA are "free to change jobs or residences", 
it is once again disingenuously ignoring the actuality of the situation in the same sense 
as suggesting that a prisoner within a minefield is free to simply walk away;  While it is 
technically possible in that it is not explicitly forbidden, it is clear to any observer that the 
circumstances are such as to make such an action as arduous and trying as possible in 
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order to motivate the supposedly free individual to voluntarily refrain from exercising that 
same alleged freedom. 
 
  The third Mendoza-Martinez factor examined was whether the act "promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment"38 and while the State of Kansas did agree that 
registration provides some manner of deterrent effect it is obvious on its face that 
virtually any non-punitive regulatory program must inherently have some ability to deter 
or be left utterly incapable of meaningful function. More arguable is the Does' argument 
that since registration times are connected to the offense committed and not to actual 
danger posed to the public39 the act is retributive in nature. The Court did not find this 
convincing however and claimed that the length of the reporting requirement was 
"reasonably related" to the possibility of recidivism, a concern which will be addressed 
later in this work. 
 
 Next the Court examined what it felt to be the "most important"40 factor: whether 
ASORA could be rationally connected to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose. The 
Supreme Court of the United States accepted that it had already been established by 
the Court of Appeals that the matter of public safety, so served by notifying the public of 
the "risk of sex offenders in their community"41, was a legitimate and nonpunitive goal 
                                                 
38 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
39 Alaska Stat. §12.63.020(a)(1) (2000) 
40 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) citing to 518 U.S. 267 (1996) 
41 John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe Ii, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Ronald O. Otte and Bruce M. Amended 
Botelho, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) 
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and indeed the Does themselves agreed that purpose was "valid, and rational."42 
Where the Does disagreed with ASORA on this point was whether or not it had a 
necessary regulatory connection to that legitimate purpose, as the Does felt that the Ac
was not "narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose."
t 
 on 
t."44 
                                                
43 The Court disagreed
this matter, finding that the Act did not require a "close or perfect fit" to its nonpunitive 
aims in order not to be considered a "sham or mere pretex
 
 The final Mendoza-Martinez factor examined, and fundamental to the issue of 
whether or not the Act was punitive in actuality if not in name, was whether or not the 
Act was "excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose"45. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was significantly motivated to decide in favor of the Does by two factors: that 
ASORA applies to all offenders regardless of the danger they pose in the future and that 
there are no limits or restrictions on accessing the information offenders report. The 
United States Supreme Court on the other hand was unconvinced, stating only that it 
found "Neither argument… persuasive."46 
 
 Coming to the end of the Mendoza-Martinez factors the Court argued that the 
State of Alaska was within its right to legislate with regard to sex offenders as a class, 
as the Ex Post Facto clause does not "preclude a State from making reasonable 
categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 
 
42 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) citing Brief for Respondents 
43 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) citing Brief for Respondents 
44 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
45 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
46 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
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regulatory consequences."47 Furthermore the Court buttressed the legitimacy of 
classifying sex offenders as a class to be inherently dangerous quoting a previous case 
which characterized the risk of recidivism as "frightening and high" as well as claiming 
that "[sex offenders] are much more likely than any other type of offender to be 
rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault"48, basing these claims on crime statistics 
from 1997.  
 
 Concluding the majority opinion the Court answered one last concern regarding 
the registration mandate's lack of dangerousness assessments in light of the Hendricks 
decision. It was the Court's opinion that the magnitude of Hendricks' restraint on an 
individual is what required an individual finding of dangerousness, whereas the "minor 
condition of registration"49 may forego individual assessments in lieu of allowing the 
public to make that assessment on a private basis using the published information. 
Arguments regarding the breadth of the internet's reach also fell short in as it was 
argued that individuals must by the nature of the internet choose to visit a website and 
seek out that same published information. ASORA was admitted to be less than ideal, 
but as Justice Kennedy stated in closing the question before the Court was not whether 
the Alaskan State Legislature had "made the best choice possible" but whether or not 
ASORA was "reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective", and the answer 
                                                 
47 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
48 Mckune v. Lile, 536 U. S. 24, 34 (2002), itself citing U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Sex Offenses and Offenders 27 (1997); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of 
Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997) 
49 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
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according to the majority of the 6-3 split was Yes: "The Act is nonpunitive, and its 
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause". 
 
 Smith v. Doe marked a turning point in sex offender cases, not just for answering 
the Ex Post Facto question directly for the first time but also for being the first case in 
which dissenting opinions begin to openly refer to these laws as punitive and pay more 
than lip service to the burden they place on an offender. Most notably of these is Justice 
Stevens' landmark dissent in which he states:  
"It is also clear beyond peradventure that these unique consequences of 
conviction of a sex offense are punitive. They share three characteristics, which 
in the aggregate are not present in any civil sanction. The sanctions (1) constitute 
a severe deprivation of the offender's liberty, (2) are imposed on everyone who is 
convicted of a relevant criminal offense, and (3) are imposed only on those 
criminals. Unlike any of the cases that the Court has cited, a criminal conviction 
under these statutes provides both a sufficient and a necessary condition for the 
sanction." 
 
 
 As was just discussed the majority opinion went to extreme lengths to find a 
means, no matter how tenuous or contrived, to find ways to justify these laws in light of 
their criminal appearance going so far throughout various cases as to tautologically 
claim a law is civil because it is civil50. In this landmark dissent Justice Stevens plays 
the role of the child pointing out that the emperor is not in fact wearing any clothes, 
openly and fervently pointing out that no matter how many logical fallacies or contrived 
constructs of language are used to hold up an obviously punitive measure as regulatory 
or civil somehow, when a law has every characteristic of a criminal punishment it is not 
                                                 
50 See analysis of Hendricks on page 18 
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sufficient to merely state that it is a civil matter by bare assertion. Justice Stevens 
furthermore refused to downplay or brush aside the profound impact which registration 
has on the lives of offenders, stating ASORA "[imposes] significant affirmative 
obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom [it applies]". This dissent 
presents one of the harshest and to date one of very few open criticisms to the concept 
of a public sex offender registry.  
 
 Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) also dissented with equal 
vehemence, stating the act imposed "onerous and intrusive obligations on convicted sex 
offenders" and "[exposed] registrants, through aggressive public notification of their 
crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism."51 Additionally Justice 
Ginsburg did not follow the majority on the reasonability of considering sex offenders as 
a class to be dangerous by default and felt the "touchstone" which triggered the act 
being solely a past crime and not current dangerousness to be evidence of the act's 
penal nature. Justice Ginsburg's opinion on class versus individual dangerousness 
would also be a key factor in finding the act to be excessive, which she felt to be where 
the act ultimately crossed from nonpunitive to openly penal. Proving that point she 
argued that the act's reporting requirements were in and of themselves "exorbitant" 
before anything else was even considered, and most significantly of all in her opinion 
was the absolute lack of any possibility for rehabilitation under the law; once so branded 
                                                 
51 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)  (Ginsburg, J., Dissenting) 
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a sex offender would be subject to "inescapable humiliation" without the chance of ever 
shortening or being released from their registration requirements. 
 
 At the same time as Smith v. Doe the United States Supreme Court was also 
hearing Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe52, a case regarding the Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety's website which provided data on registered sex offenders. 
A John Doe challenged the law in federal court claiming that the law behind the 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety's website (and information collections for said 
website) was a violation of his fourteenth amendment right to Due Process. The District 
Court of Appeals decided in the Doe's favor on the grounds that hearings were not 
provided prior to public disclosure, but the state appealed and the United States 
Supreme Court accepted the case.  
 
 The United States Supreme Court decided unanimously that "due process does 
not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the state's statutory 
scheme." and that even a defamatory injury "does not constitute the deprivation of a 
liberty interest."53 With this decision arguments at the federal level regarding a public 
sex offender registry were effectively silenced. The Supreme Court had ruled that such 
registries were non-punitive civil measures, not subject to the prohibition of Ex Post 
Facto laws, that registration was not a violation of due process even without a hearing 
                                                 
52 Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) 
53 as held in Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976) 
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before publication, and that the damage to a registered offender's reputation did not 
constitute a loss of a liberty interest.  
 
The only aspect of the modern system of sex offender legislation not yet challenged 
was brought into existence in 2006 with the passing of the Adam Walsh Act: Whether 
the federal government could order the continued incarceration of a registered sex 
offender beyond the term of their actual prison sentence through civil commitment and if 
so in what way. The inevitable challenge would be brought in 2010 by United States v. 
Comstock54. 
 
 In United States v. Comstock55 then attorney general Alberto Gonzales certified 
that Graydon Comstock was a "sexually dangerous person" six days before the 
conclusion of Comstock's prison sentence. Under the terms of the Adam Walsh Act this 
gave the federal government the ability to commit Comstock to a civil institution, a 
power which was challenged by Comstock on the grounds that it fell outside of the 
Enumerated Powers of Congress. The lower courts agreed with Comstock's challenge 
and ruled the law which Gonzales was applying as unconstitutional, and the federal 
government appealed. The United States Supreme Court accepted the case and, 
limiting their decision to the issue of Congressional Authority, ruled 7-2 that under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause Congress had the authority to enact the provisions 
                                                 
54 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___ (2010) 
55 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___ (2010) 
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challenged. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court and laid out "five 
considerations" by which the law was constitutional: 
 
First, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad power to enact 
laws that are "reasonably related" to executing the other enumerated powers. 
Second, the statute at issue "constitutes a modest addition" to related statutes 
that have existed for many decades.  Third, the statute in question reasonably 
extends longstanding policy. Fourth, the statute properly accounts for state 
interests, by ending the federal government's role "with respect to an individual 
covered by the statute" whenever a state requests. Fifth, the statute is narrowly 
tailored to only address the legitimate federal interest. 
 
 The five considerations are the circumstances and context of the Adam Walsh 
Act which altogether satisfy a nexus of valid Congressional authority. When the five 
considerations are taken individually their interplay in this nexus can be examined 
through its component parts: The first consideration, that of a respected use of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is justified by the nature of the Adam Walsh Act as being 
primarily a system of standards for states to tailor their already existing laws to. This 
nature also satisfies the second consideration that the Adam Walsh Act composes a 
"modest addition" to various related statutes which have existed for decades, as well as 
the third consideration that the specific statute in question is merely the logical 
continuance of a "longstanding policy"; a policy taken directly from existing state level 
laws and which had come before the United States Supreme Court previously56.  
 
                                                 
56 Hendricks and Crane most notably 
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 The remaining two considerations are born of another line of logic relating to the 
proper relation between the federal government and the states. In the fourth 
consideration the federal government has in place procedures to effectively "hand off" 
any case to a state with proper jurisdiction; effectively federal involvement is voluntary 
and only at the sufferance of the states. Finally in the fifth consideration the statute is in 
and of itself found by the United States Supreme Court to be both "narrowly tailored" 
and dealing with an issue in which there is a "legitimate federal interest".  
 
Outliers: Unique Circumstances 
 Firstly, there is the matter of a significant legal outlier: Missouri. Of all states 
Missouri has produced some of the most unique trials and decisions with regards to this 
topic, due in large part to a constitutional provision which states that "no Ex Post Facto 
law… or [law] retrospective in its operation… can be enacted." 57 Bolstered by this 
surprisingly rare constitutional prohibition on Ex Post Facto legislation a number of sex 
offenders have made various challenges over the years to everything from registration 
itself to a statute regarding Halloween activities58. Perhaps more extraordinary than the 
breadth and number of legal challenges brought in this state is the rate of success 
which its residents enjoy, many of these challenges have been successful even if only 
to the extent that the courts render a decision applicable only to a given individual 
plaintiff59.  
                                                 
57 M.O. Const. Article 1 § 13 
58 589.426 RSmo 2008 
59 State of Missouri v. Raynor, 301 S.W.3d 56 (2010) notably 
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 The most significant of these challenges arises as a direct challenge to the 
Missouri Megan's Law. In the case which would eventually become Doe v. Phillips60 
when it reached the Missouri Supreme Court a number of male and female resident sex 
offenders (but none adjudicated Sexually Violent Predators) alleged that, in the words of 
Justice Laura Stith, "while it may be proper to apply the registration and notification 
requirements to SVPs and other violent sexual offenders, it is unconstitutional to apply it 
to relatively minor offenders such as [the plaintiffs]". In addition to these grounds the 
Does, those whose standing had not been rendered moot when a bill altering Missouri's 
laws to expand the categorization of SVPs and alter which offenses are permitted to 
petition for removal61 , buttressed their argument with a number of other significant 
complaints as well, even going so far as to cite the United States Constitution's 
prohibition against state bills of attainder62. The primary thrust of these additional 
grounds was one of Due Process, Missouri's Megan's Law was argued to be a violation 
of the Does' substantive due process rights, specifically their personal choices and 
freedoms once released from custody as well as their right to privacy and freedom from 
a particularly abhorrent stigma. The Does, or rather a particularly inventive member of 
their legal counsel, also proffered the curious interpretation of Equal Protection: They 
argued their right to such was violated by the indiscriminate application of the Law's 
registration requirements and personal restrictions to both significant and violent 
                                                 
60 Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 837 (Mo. banc 2006) 
61 H.B. 1698, 93rd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo.2006) 
62 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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offenders, and those who either pled out to lesser crimes or otherwise had attached to 
them no proof of future dangerousness. 
 
 The Missouri Supreme Court, though bound by both the federal and state 
constitutions, nevertheless found grounds on which to deny the Does' arguments of 
Equal Protection, Due Process, and Ex Post Facto effect through the ruling of State v. 
Rushing63  where a previous sitting of the Court believed analysis of the federal 
constitution to be "strongly persuasive" to the interpretation of comparable sections of 
the state's constitution, finding a persuasive reason not to expand upon Missouri's 
constitutional equivalent to the federal Fourth Amendment. The Phillips court, 
respecting this precedent, thus found the Does to have provided no persuasive reason 
to interpret Missouri's constitutional provisions with greater latitude than those "nearly 
identical" in the federal constitution64.  
 
 In deciding Doe v. Phillips the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to place on the registry anyone convicted of (or who had pleaded guilty 
to) a registrable offense prior to January 1st 1995 and remanded the case back to the 
lower Jackson County Circuit Court… which promptly ordered the removal of anyone 
placed on the registry retroactively. This resulted in two immediate reactions: First a 
defendant (James Keathley) appealed back to the Missouri Supreme Court and second 
the Missouri state legislature attempted to pass a constitutional amendment specifically 
                                                 
63State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1996) 
64 Doe v. Phillips,194 S.W.3d 837 (Mo. banc 2006) 
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exempting sex offender laws from the ban on retrospective laws. The Legislature's 
attempts failed two sessions in a row in 2007 and 2008 due to the Missouri House of 
Representatives failing to pass the bill as the Senate had, while Keathley's appeal was 
accepted by the Missouri Supreme Court and the case (Doe v. Keathley now) was 
heard in 2009. In this decision, occurring after the Adam Walsh Act had been signed 
into law, it was ruled that though Missouri's constitution itself exempt certain offenders 
from registration the injunction of Doe v. Phillips could not exempt sex offenders from 
that same requirement under the separate federal obligation65 imposed by SORNA. 
Now held under a federal obligation outside of the purview of the Missouri constitution 
all sex offenders who had previously been exempt by the Doe v. Phillips injunction were 
required to register once again. 
 
 This requirement would in 2010 be overturned in part but not in whole when a 
Cole County Circuit Judge ruled that those who had pleaded guilty to a sex offense prior 
to the original Missouri registration law were not required to register themselves as the 
applicable federal laws in Keathley did not apply in their cases, carving a narrow 
exception to the Keathley ruling. As stated previously the nature of Missouri's unique 
constitutional provisions provide a rare legal climate in which challenges to registration 
or other post-release restrictions have unusually persuasive constitutional grounds on 
which to stand. As such there have been numerous additional cases in Missouri related 
to restrictions on residence or other activities which resulted in relief only for the 
                                                 
65 42 U.S.C. § 16913 
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individual plaintiff in the case; these cases are not particularly significant except for their 
success in and of itself and being so narrowly construed as to literally apply to one 
individual are unlikely to be especially persuasive precedents66, therefore beyond this 
degree they merit no further discussion here.  
 
 One other state-limited case of note, especially as it was decided concurrently 
with the opening arguments of Kansas v. Crane, is Hawaii's State v. Bani67 of 2001; in 
which the Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled that the state's sex offender registry 
violated the Due Process clause of Hawaii's state constitution as it required "public 
notification of (the potential registrant's) status as a convicted sex offender without 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any preliminary determination of whether and to 
what extent (he) actually represents a danger to society." Bani also had the unique 
notability of deciding in favor of a challenge that a sex offense law was in violation of the 
right to Due Process at the same time that arguments were being heard regarding a 
similar issue of Due Process in a United States Supreme Court case68, Kansas v. 
Crane, as previously discussed. 
 
 While the status of sex offender legislation at the state level was in all likelihood 
entrenched with the decisions of Crane and Smith v. Doe it was likely that the decision 
in Comstock, finding the most comprehensive and far reaching federal legislation to be 
                                                 
66 F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff's Department and state of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor as 
examples 
67 State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255 (Haw. 2001) 
68 Crane, discussed on page 6 
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a valid exercise of congressional authority, has secured the future of sex offender 
legislation in the nation. Short of a significant legislative reversal or a radical alteration 
of the United States Supreme Court's judicial makeup it is unlikely that any further 
challenges to the primary aspects of the modern SORNA system, i.e. registration, 
publication of personal information, and civil commitment, would be successful.  
 
Objective Analysis 
 As previously stated it is a common fact that for some time politicians and other 
involved parties have claimed the progressive iterations of sex offender legislation, 
particularly the increasingly penal nature and growing harshness of the law, has been 
the direct root of any successes in lowering the overall rate of sex crimes and 
colloquially making the nation "safer" in that respect. It is also a common fact that, 
despite the previous claim, the political rhetoric on the subject (as well as the position of 
the mainstream media) has been one of Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt. Threats and 
dangerous predators lurk around every corner waiting to snatch any child within and 
commit unspeakable crimes. Spending even a small amount of time listening to virtually 
any major news network and it becomes immediately apparent that this imagery and 
rhetoric, the boogeyman of The Sexual Predator, permeates the public consciousness 
and likely provides a substantial justification for the cycle of continually harsher sex 
offender legislation.  
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 A firm judicial or legislative standing is not a license to simply accept the status 
quo and take all arguments in support of it for granted, particularly when confronted with 
an issue this sensitive and prone to inflammatory rhetoric and politicization. It is a civil, 
moral, and academic imperative to examine the facts and objectively determine the 
efficacy of the status quo in light of its supposed goals and whether the evidence 
supports the continued political claims with regard to these laws. In order to avoid 
numerous experimental difficulties, and in keeping with the nature of this work as well 
as decades old wisdom69, the methodology of this analysis is as follows.  
Methodology 
 Accepted as given: First, the political rhetoric regarding sex offender registration 
and the accompanying restrictions are commonplace in the general media and in 
general may be summed up as stating that the various iterations of registration laws 
over the years have directly resulted in increased "safety", which will be translated as 
decreased incidences of sexual crimes as defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting 
system. Second, as the federal and state governments have an inherent motivation to 
keep accurate data regarding criminal offenses in general and sexual offenses in 
particular, that same data will be considered to be reliable by default despite counting 
Forcible Rape only against women. The National Crime Victimization Survey, being 
extrapolated from a sample size rather than directly reported national data, have been 
foregone in favor of the Uniform Crime Report. 
 
                                                 
69 "If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough" - Albert Einstein 
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 Within that framework, and thanks to the abundance of statistical data from 1971 
until 2009, it is a simple matter to compare the significant dates of the major sex 
offender registration laws such as the 1997 compliance deadline of the original 
Wetterling Act against the real number and population adjusted rate of sexual offenses 
both at the national level and within the State of Florida. For control purposes the overall 
rate of violent crimes not falling under the purview of these acts will also be considered. 
On the following pages are three tables of data which collectively show the rates of 
violent crime and sex crimes at the national level and within the State of Florida.
Table 1: Estimated crime in United States-Total 
Y ear Population
Violen t c rime 
tota l
Murder and 
nonnegligent  
Manslaugh ter Forcible  rape
A ggravated 
assault
V iolent Crime 
ra te
Murder and 
nonneg ligen t 
manslaughter 
rate
Forcible  rape  
ra te
Aggravated 
assault ra te
1971 206,212,000 .0 816,500.0 17,780 .0 42,260.0 368,760.0 396.0 8 .6 20.5 178.8
1972 208,230,000 .0 834,900.0 18,670 .0 46,850.0 393,090.0 401.0 9 .0 22.5 188.8
1973 209,851,000 .0 875,910.0 19,640 .0 51,400.0 420,650.0 417.4 9 .4 24.5 200.5
1974 211,392,000 .0 974,720.0 20,710 .0 55,400.0 456,210.0 461.1 9 .8 26.2 215.8
1975 213,124,000 .0 1,039 ,710.0 20,510 .0 56,090.0 492,620.0 487.8 9 .6 26.3 231.1
1976 214,659,000 .0 1,004 ,210.0 18,780 .0 57,080.0 500,530.0 467.8 8 .7 26.6 233.2
1977 216,332,000 .0 1,029 ,580.0 19,120 .0 63,500.0 534,350.0 475.9 8 .8 29.4 247.0
1978 218,059,000 .0 1,085 ,550.0 19,560 .0 67,610.0 571,460.0 497.8 9 .0 31.0 262.1
1979 220,099,000 .0 1,208 ,030.0 21,460 .0 76,390.0 629,480.0 548.9 9 .8 34.7 286.0
1980 225,349,264 .0 1,344 ,520.0 23,040 .0 82,990.0 672,650.0 596.6 10.2 36.8 298.5
1981 229,465,714 .0 1,361 ,820.0 22,520 .0 82,500.0 663,900.0 593.5 9 .8 36.0 289.3
1982 231,664,458 .0 1,322 ,390.0 21,010 .0 78,770.0 669,480.0 570.8 9 .1 34.0 289.0
1983 233,791,994 .0 1,258 ,087.0 19,308 .0 78,918.0 653,294.0 538.1 8 .3 33.8 279.4
1984 235,824,902 .0 1,273 ,282.0 18,692 .0 84,233.0 685,349.0 539.9 7 .9 35.7 290.6
1985 237,923,795 .0 1,327 ,767.0 18,976 .0 87,671.0 723,246.0 558.1 8 .0 36.8 304.0
1986 240,132,887 .0 1,489 ,169.0 20,613 .0 91,459.0 834,322.0 620.1 8 .6 38.1 347.4
1987 242,288,918 .0 1,483 ,999.0 20,096 .0 91,111.0 855,088.0 612.5 8 .3 37.6 352.9
1988 244,498,982 .0 1,566 ,221.0 20,675 .0 92,486.0 910,092.0 640.6 8 .5 37.8 372.2
1989 246,819,230 .0 1,646 ,037.0 21,500 .0 94,504.0 951,707.0 666.9 8 .7 38.3 385.6
1990 249,464,396 .0 1,820 ,127.0 23,438 .0 102,555 .0 1,054 ,863.0 729.6 9 .4 41.1 422.9
1991 252,153,092 .0 1,911 ,767.0 24,703 .0 106,593 .0 1,092 ,739.0 758.2 9 .8 42.3 433.4
1992 255,029,699 .0 1,932 ,274.0 23,760 .0 109,062 .0 1,126 ,974.0 757.7 9 .3 42.8 441.9
1993 257,782,608 .0 1,926 ,017.0 24,526 .0 106,014 .0 1,135 ,607.0 747.1 9 .5 41.1 440.5
1994 260,327,021 .0 1,857 ,670.0 23,326 .0 102,216 .0 1,113 ,179.0 713.6 9 .0 39.3 427.6
1995 262,803,276 .0 1,798 ,792.0 21,606 .0 97,470.0 1,099 ,207.0 684.5 8 .2 37.1 418.3
1996 265,228,572 .0 1,688 ,540.0 19,645 .0 96,252.0 1,037 ,049.0 636.6 7 .4 36.3 391.0
1997 267,783,607 .0 1,636 ,096.0 18,208 .0 96,153.0 1,023 ,201.0 611.0 6 .8 35.9 382.1
1998 270,248,003 .0 1,533 ,887.0 16,974 .0 93,144.0 976,583.0 567.6 6 .3 34.5 361.4
1999 272,690,813 .0 1,426 ,044.0 15,522 .0 89,411.0 911,740.0 523.0 5 .7 32.8 334.3
2000 281,421,906 .0 1,425 ,486.0 15,586 .0 90,178.0 911,706.0 506.5 5 .5 32.0 324.0
2001 285,317,559 .0 1,439 ,480.0 16,037 .0 90,863.0 909,023.0 504.5 5 .6 31.8 318.6
2002 287,973,924 .0 1,423 ,677.0 16,229 .0 95,235.0 891,407.0 494.4 5 .6 33.1 309.5
2003 290,788,976 .0 1,383 ,676.0 16,528 .0 93,883.0 859,030.0 475.8 5 .7 32.3 295.4
2004 293,656,842 .0 1,360 ,088.0 16,148 .0 95,089.0 847,381.0 463.2 5 .5 32.4 288.6
2005 296,507,061 .0 1,390 ,745.0 16,740 .0 94,347.0 862,220.0 469.0 5 .6 31.8 290.8
2006 299,398,484 .0 1,418 ,043.0 17,030 .0 92,757.0 860,853.0 473.6 5 .7 31.0 287.5
2007 301,621,157 .0 1,408 ,337.0 16,929 .0 90,427.0 855,856.0 466.9 5 .6 30.0 283.8
2008 304,374,846 .0 1,392 ,629.0 16,442 .0 90,479.0 842,134.0 457.5 5 .4 29.7 276.7
2009 307,006,550 .0 1,318 ,398.0 15,241 .0 88,097.0 806,843.0 429.4 5 .0 28.7 262.8
T he 2,823 m urder and nonnegligent hom icides that occurred as  a result of the events of Septem ber 11, 
2001, are not included in the national estim ates.
N ational or state offense totals are based on data from  all reporting agencies and estim ates for unreported areas.
 Rates are the number of reported offenses per 100,000 population 
U nited States-T otal  -  T he 168 murder and nonnegligent hom icides that occurred as a result of the bom bing of the 
Alfred P. M urrah Federal Building in Oklahom a City in 1995 are included in the national estim ate.
Sources: F BI, U niform  C rim e Reports, prepared by the N ational Archive of C rim inal Justice Data 
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D ate of download: Mar 12 2012 
U niform  Crime Reporting Statistics -  UC R Data Online
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/
Table 2: Statewide Sex Offenses for Florida, 1971 - 2010. 
Year Popula tion
Rape by 
Force
A ttempted  
Rape
Total 
Forcible 
Rape
Forcible Rape 
Rate per 
100 ,000
P ercent 
Change 
Rape Rate
Percent  Change 
Rape Number
Forcible  
Sodomy
Forcible 
Fond ling
Total Forcible  
S ex Of fenses
Forcible Sex 
O ffenses Rate  
per 100,000
P ercen t Change 
S ex O ffenses  Rate
per 100 ,000
1971 7,041,074 1,191 517 1,708 24.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1972 7,441,545 1,382 537 1,919 25.8 6.3 12.4 -- -- -- -- --
1973 7,845,092 1,792 658 2,450 31.2 21.1 27.7 -- -- -- -- --
1974 8,248,851 2,153 751 2,904 35.2 12.7 18.5 -- -- -- -- --
1975 8,485,230 2,158 827 2,985 35.2 -0.1 2.8 -- -- -- -- --
1976 8,551,814 2,255 796 3,051 35.7 1.4 2.2 -- -- -- -- --
1977 8,717,334 2,532 810 3,342 38.3 7.5 9.5 -- -- -- -- --
1978 8,967,206 3,024 936 3,960 44.2 15.2 18.5 -- -- -- -- --
1979 9,245,231 3,541 1,032 4,573 49.5 12.0 15.5 -- -- -- -- --
1980 9,579,497 4,230 1,205 5,435 56.7 14.7 18.8 -- -- -- -- --
1981 10,097,754 4,460 1,247 5,707 56.5 -0.4 5.0 -- -- -- -- --
1982 10,375,332 4,278 1,308 5,586 53.8 -4.7 -2.1 -- -- -- -- --
1983 10,591,701 3,952 1,218 5,170 48.8 -9.3 -7.4 -- -- -- -- --
1984 10,930,389 4,320 1,256 5,576 51.0 4.5 7.9 -- -- -- -- --
1985 11,278,547 4,824 1,180 6,004 53.2 4.4 7.7 -- -- -- -- --
1986 11,657,843 4,903 1,250 6,153 52.8 -0.9 2.5 -- -- -- -- --
1987 12,043,608 4,823 1,194 6,017 50.0 -5.3 -2.2 -- -- -- -- --
1988 12,417,606 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1989 12,797,318 5,599 700 6,299 49.2 -- -- 1 ,531 3,367 11,197 87.5 --
1990 13,150,027 6,004 663 6,667 50.7 3.0 5.8 1,593 3,770 12,030 91.5 4 .6
1991 13,195,952 6,379 590 6,969 52.8 4.2 4.5 1,509 3,912 12,390 93.9 2 .6
1992 13,424,416 6,598 682 7,280 54.2 2.7 4.5 1,740 4,409 13,429 100.0 6 .5
1993 13,608,627 6,713 550 7,263 53.4 -1.6 -0.2 1,948 4,541 13,752 101.1 1 .0
1994 13,878,905 6,630 584 7,214 52.0 -2.6 -0.7 2,009 4,190 13,413 96.6 -4.4
1995 14,149,317 6,299 525 6,824 48.2 -7.2 -5.4 1,678 3,757 12,259 86.6 -10.4
1996 14,411,563 6,964 544 7,508 52.1 8.0 10.0 1,509 3,925 12,942 89.8 3 .7
1997 14,712,922 7,142 530 7,672 52.1 0.1 2.2 1,680 3,872 13,224 89.9 0 .1
1998 15,000,475 6,858 535 7,393 49.3 -5.5 -3.6 1,561 3,748 12,702 84.7 -5.8
1999 15,322,040 6,429 536 6,965 45.5 -7.8 -5.8 1,582 4,036 12,583 82.1 -3.0
2000 15,982,378 6,480 472 6,952 43.5 -4.3 -0.2 1,485 3,951 12,388 77.5 -5.6
2001 16,331,739 6,175 455 6,630 40.6 -6.7 -4.6 1,587 4,539 12,756 78.1 0 .8
2002 16,674,608 6,276 428 6,704 40.2 -0.9 1.1 1,559 4,547 12,810 76.8 -1.6
2003 17,071,508 6,323 401 6,724 39.4 -2.0 0.3 1,596 4,436 12,756 74.7 -2.7
2004 17,516,732 6,168 441 6,609 37.7 -4.2 -1.7 1,490 4,328 12,427 70.9 -5.1
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2005 17,918,227 6,156 420 6,576 36.7 -2.7 -0.5 1,507 4,147 12,230 68.3 -3.7
2006 18,349,132 6,102 369 6,471 35.3 -3.9 -1.6 1,360 3,736 11,567 63 -7.7
2007 18,680,367 5,762 383 6,145 32.9 -6.8 -5 1,402 3,667 11,214 60 -4.8
2008 18,807,219 5,606 356 5,962 29.8 -9.4 -3.0 1,301 3,560 10,823 57.5 -4.1
2009 18,750,483 5,170 324 5,494 29.3 -1.7 -7.8 1,306 3,427 10,227 54.5 -5.2
S OURCE:  Florida Sta tistica l Analysis Center:  FDLE (1971-2010). Crime in Flo rida,  Flo rida unifo rm crime report  [Computer program]. Ta llahassee , FL .  
Table 3: Florida's Crime Rate, 1971 - 2010 
 
Year P opulation
Total Index 
Crime
Total 
Violent 
Crime
Total  
Nonviolent 
Crime
Index Rate  per 
100 ,000
P opulation 
Per cent 
Change
Index Crime 
Per cent Change
Index Rate 
P ercent 
Change
1971 7,041,074 399,055 38,571 360,484 5 ,667.5 -- -- --
1972 7,441,545 390,319 40,268 350,051 5 ,245.1 5.7 -2.2 -7.5
1973 7,845,092 457,882 46,430 411,452 5 ,836.5 5.4 17.3 11 .3
1974 8,248,851 597,667 54,852 542,815 7 ,245.5 5.1 30.5 24 .1
1975 8,485,230 645,338 57,663 587,675 7 ,605.4 2.9 8.0 5.0
1976 8,551,814 590,104 54,543 535,561 6 ,900.3 0.8 -8.6 -9.3
1977 8,717,334 568,878 57,957 510,921 6 ,525.8 1.9 -3.6 -5.4
1978 8,967,206 607,291 65,784 541,507 6 ,772.4 2.9 6.8 3.8
1979 9,245,231 680,896 73,866 607,030 7 ,364.8 3.1 12.1 8.7
1980 9,579,497 803,509 94,088 709,421 8 ,387.8 3.6 18 13.9
1981 10,097,754 816,439 98,090 718,349 8 ,085.4 5.4 1.6 -3.6
1982 10,375,332 777,517 93,406 684,111 7 ,493.9 2.7 -4.8 -7.3
1983 10,591,701 724,247 88,298 635,949 6 ,837.9 2.1 -6.9 -8.8
1984 10,930,389 749,231 95,368 653,863 6 ,854.6 3.2 3.4 0.2
1985 11,278,547 860,957 106,980 753,977 7 ,633.6 3.2 14.9 11 .4
1986 11,657,843 960,374 120,977 839,397 8 ,238.0 3.4 11.5 7.9
1987 12,043,608 1,021 ,283 123,030 898,253 8 ,479.9 3.3 6.3 2.9
1988 12,417,606 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1989 12,797,318 1,120 ,515 145,473 975,042 8 ,755.9 -- -- --
1990 13,150,027 1,122 ,935 160,554 962,381 8 ,539.4 2.8 0.2 -2.5
1991 13,195,952 1,129 ,704 158,181 971,523 8 ,561.0 0.3 0.6 0.3
1992 13,424,416 1,112 ,746 161,137 951,609 8 ,289.0 1.7 -1.5 -3.2
1993 13,608,627 1,116 ,567 161,789 954,778 8 ,204.8 1.4 0.3 -1.0
1994 13,878,905 1,130 ,875 157,835 973,040 8 ,148.2 2 1.3 -0.7
1995 14,149,317 1,078 ,619 150,208 928,411 7 ,623.1 1.9 -4.6 -6.4
1996 14,411,563 1,079 ,623 151,350 928,273 7 ,491.4 1.9 0.1 -1.7
1997 14,712,922 1,073 ,757 150,801 922,956 7 ,298.1 2.1 -0.5 -2.6
1998 15,000,475 1,025 ,100 139,673 885,427 6 ,833.8 2 -4.5 -6.4
1999 15,322,040 934,349 128,859 805,490 6 ,098.1 2.1 -8.9 -10.8
2000 15,982,378 895,708 128,041 767,667 5 ,604.3 4.3 -4.1 -8.1
2001 16,331,739 911,292 130,323 780,969 5 ,579.9 2.2 1.7 -0.4
2002 16,674,608 900,155 127,905 772,250 5 ,398.4 2.1 -1.2 -3.3
2003 17,071,508 881,615 124,236 757,379 5 ,164.2 2.4 -2.1 -4.3
2004 17,516,732 850,490 123,697 726,793 4 ,855.3 2.6 -3.5 -6.0
2005 17,918,227 838,063 125,825 712,238 4 ,677.2 2.3 -1.5 -3.7
2006 18,349,132 849,926 129,501 720,425 4 ,632.0 2.4 1.4 -1
2007 18,860,367 876,981 131,781 745,200 4 ,694.7 2.8 3.2 1.4
2008 18,807,219 883,905 126,072 757,833 4 ,699.8 0.7 0.8 0.1
2009 18,750,483 824,559 113,415 711,144 4 ,397.5 -0.3 -6.7 -6.4
SOURCE: Florida  Statistica l Analysis Center:   FDLE, Crime in  Florida, Flo rida un if orm crime report, 1971-2010 . Tallahassee, FL.  
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Analysis 
 The data begins in 1971, showing a national violent crime rate of 396 violent 
crimes per 100,000 individuals70 and the Florida violent crime rate of 5,667.5 per 
100,000 individuals71. From here it is important to note that of use to this work is not the 
exact rate of offenses but the overall trend of that rate over time. The rate of violent 
crime not including sex offenses may seem irrelevant at first however it is in fact a vital 
baseline. As there has been no SORNA or comparable legislation (let alone the ordered 
progression thereof) for violent crimes such as aggravated assault, murder, and the like 
violent crime should be affected only by the overall state of society rather than artificially 
suppressed through directed legislative efforts. If the rhetoric is valid, and legislation 
such as SORNA and its predecessors are indeed responsible for suppressing both 
initial sexual offenses and recidivism, then the rate of sexual crimes should show a 
marked difference from the baseline rate of "ordinary" (violent and personal) predatory 
crimes which at least correlates to the dates where major legislation took effect. 
 
 With that in mind the most significant dates may be considered to be the primary 
landmarks of federal legislation: The 1994 Wetterling Act, the 1996 Megan's Law and 
Pam Lychner acts, the 1997 Wetterling Improvements Act, and the 2006 Adam Walsh 
Protection Act (SORNA). Following this timeline, if the rhetoric holds true to its claims, 
sexual crimes should show a marked decrease as compared to the baseline rate of 
                                                 
70 Table 1 
71 Table 3 
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violent crime starting in approximately 1995 after the Wetterling Act would have had 
time to begin to take effect… and at first glance it would seem to be the case that this 
holds true. Beginning in 1994 the national rate of forcible rape began a slow but steady 
decline, and in the State of Florida the rate of forcible sex crimes began to decrease 
irregularly yet markedly from what had appeared to be a 5 year upward trend going 
back to the beginning of recorded data in 1989. Interestingly however the rate of forcible 
rape in the State of Florida continued to hold steady around approximately 50 per 
100,000 individuals for another four years, making for a 20 year high beginning in 1979 
and lasting until 1998.  
 
 All of this appears to point to a reductive effect coinciding with federal legislation; 
however there are two issues with this interpretation. First, recall the significance 
assigned to the overall trends of the violent and sexual crime rates. The rate of sexual 
crimes, and of forcible rape, does decline beginning in 1994, however so does the rate 
of violent crime in almost identical proportions. Furthermore as additional national UCR 
data contained in the appendices shows this trend extends beyond violent crime into the 
national rate of robberies per 100,000 people as well… a crime well beyond the purview 
of federal sex offender legislation. In fact the reduction in all crime is so profound that it 
outstrips population growth and even in Table 3's list of Total Nonviolent Crime, which is 
not a population adjusted figure, still holds true to the trend. 
 
 Now, perhaps the legislative fervor of the Houses of Congress singlehandedly 
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frightened the entirety of the criminal world within the United States of America into 
submission in 1994 with the Wetterling Act, it is not impossible that the sheer quantity of 
attention directed at this one area of criminal behavior led to the rest of America's less 
than upstanding citizens deciding en masse that it would be best to find a more 
publically acceptable occupation or hobby before they drew too much attention. It is 
decidedly more likely though that there was already a pre-existing trend to the reduction 
of all crime and the measured reduction in sex offenses was nothing more than this 
trend showing through in a class of crime under such intense and myopic scrutiny (or 
subject to such disingenuous political opportunism) that the greater trend went 
uncredited. It strains credulity to claim that legislation on a single family of offenses, 
even legislation as high profile as sex offender registration's many iterations, could have 
such a widespread impact that even the rate of robberies in the United States of 
America would be nearly halved along the same timeline as the reduction in sexual 
offenses72. 
 
Unforeseen Consequences 
 If, then, these laws did not accomplish their stated goal and merely had the 
appearance of correlation rather than any true causation, the question then becomes 
what were the results of these laws. The consensus, as summarized73 by George B. 
Palermo in the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 
                                                 
72 Table 1: 256 robberies per 100,000 people in 1993 descending to 133 in 2009; 51.9% of the 1993 
value.  
73 Palermo summarizing Applebaum, Farkas, Levenson, Palermo & Farkas, Prescott and Zevitz 
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is that registration has had an effect… but not remotely the desired one. It is a fact often 
lost in the dryness of academia and the fervor of political rhetoric that registration does 
not occur in a vacuum. These lists are not magic scrolls within sealed containers acting 
as talismans against those whose names and crimes are enumerated within, they are 
public, inflammatory, and to the offenders listed in them terribly effective at publicizing 
their contents. Now if the issues of cost, efficacy and constitutional erosion, are not 
enough to induce a healthy skepticism of the value of these registries as they exist then 
perhaps the opinions of mental health professionals (the experts tasked with handling 
and treating offenders) on the topic of community notification, an integral and arguably 
defining part of a modern sex offender registry, should be considered as holding 
considerable weight. In results collected74 from another work which surveyed 499 
mental health professionals 36% may have voiced some support for the efficacy of 
community notification in increasing community safety but a larger 40% felt that there 
was no effect at all and 26% actually believed the registries to be less safe. In two more 
surveys cited by the same work 70% and 74% of surveyed mental health professionals 
felt community notification gave a false sense of security.  
 
 Their skepticism is not without good cause. Registered sex offenders face not a 
lifetime of ostracism and harassment to such an extent that for many it may well be 
impossible for them to ever reintegrate into society or even live within it at all. In a study 
                                                 
74 Lasher & McGrath citing  McGrath, Cumming, Burchard, Zeoli, & Ellerby; Malesky and Keim; and 
Levenson, Fortney, and Baker internally 
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which sought to collect and analyze the collective body of research in this field75 the 
results showed up to 1/3rd of sex offenders reported losing their jobs, slightly less than 
1/10th reported violent attacks, and the reports of surveyed families painted an even 
bleaker picture; a staggering 82% reported financial hardship, 44% reported 
harassment, and 7% reported being assaulted or injured just by virtue of their 
relationship with a registered offender. It should be no wonder then that some regions 
have found themselves holding released sex offenders in out of the way motels while 
they desperately attempt to find housing and employment that meets the restrictions 
placed on them76, though in other less hospitable districts there have been cases of 
offenders being forced into homelessness77 by residency restrictions and thereafter 
arrested for failing to register an address. 
 
                                                 
75 Lasher & McGrath 
76 Langhorne 
77 Dewan 
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Conclusion 
 It is these kinds of consequences, often dismissed as acceptable collateral 
damage for a class of people so publically reviled, which in actuality prove registries and 
notification to be counter-productive. Evidence has been found which links these 
supposedly acceptable side-effects to increased recidivism78, a conclusion which 
should surprise no one. It does not take a rigorous graduate education to know that 
creating an ostracized and reviled subclass with no prospects for employment, eve
shrinking opportunities for shelter, subject to constant harassment and even assault
not a productive means of discouraging recidivism. The evidence speaks for itself:
offender registries as they exist today are a product of political profiteering and public 
hysteria ineffective at their stated purpose and increasingly found to be openly counter-
productive and damaging; With the current legal trend towards ever-increasing 
restrictions and punishments the (alleged) outlier result of involuntarily homeless and 
jobless sex offenders is fast becoming the new reality. The moral panic which propelled 
the myth of the lurking predator into power came from a handful of high profile cases 
which ordinarily only exist in Hollywood's imagination as the vast majority of sex 
offenses are committed by relations and acquaintances. It is time for a reform of these 
laws; this time founded on evidence based reasoning and rigorous study rather than 
moral panic and political grandstanding. The status quo is simply untenable. 
r 
, is 
 sex 
                                                
 
 
78 Lasher and McGrath internally citing Freeman & Sandler, 2010; Hanson et al., 2009 
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Limiting Factors 
 There are a number of limiting or confounding factors which deserve to be 
recognized. First and foremost the lack of national UCR data for the broader category of 
sexual offenses other than forcible female rape is a significant limiting factor for 
nationwide analysis. Secondly, and merely limiting, is the lack of comparably formatted 
UCR data from other states. Comparing the trend of sexual offenses over time across 
multiple states, particularly in the pre-SORNA years, would allow for greater specificity 
than an overall national average. Lastly an in-depth comparison of the trends of sexual 
offenses over time in regions with differing post-release restrictions would be an 
excellent measurement of efficacy, but given the nature of research involved and the 
confounding factors of development and demographics would likely require exorbitant 
man-hours to perform. 
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Appendix: Sex Offender Registration Laws by State Pre-Standardization, 1996 
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